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PLANNING FOR ARMSLENGTH FAMILY
TRANSACTIONS
Thomas B. Lemann*
FAMILY TRANSFERS AND TAXABLE GIFTS
Can there be such a thing as an armslength family transaction?
Theoretically there can indeed; practically it may not be easy. If A
employs his son B in the family business, we may expect a court to
scrutinize closely B's compensation to see if it contains any element
of gift, for human nature tells us that B is a natural object of A's
bounty. Yet the Tax Court has said:
While a father in the normal course of events would be expected
to want to benefit a son, it does not follow that every transaction
with a son must be endowed with a conclusive presumption of
suspicion.'
The Commissioner routinely contends that family transfers con-
stitute taxable gifts, and taxpayers frequently contend the contrary.
In the leading case of Commissioner v. Wemyss2 there was a transfer
of property to the taxpayer's prospective wife in consideration of her
promise of marriage and to compensate her for the loss of certain
income that, upon her marriage, would be diverted to a child by a
former marriage. The taxpayer argued that, under the circumstances,
he had no "donative intent" and hence the transfer could not be a
taxable gift. But the Court held that it was not an armslength trans-
fer, realizing that donative intent, whatever it is, depends upon
subjective, personal feelings, and that it goes against human experi-
ence to think that a man would not have such feelings toward his
fiancee.
The Commissioner has asserted that "donative intent" is not
required for a taxable gift since the Wemyss case was decided.3 But
the Treasury Regulations still contain a reference to "donative in-
tent" in § 25.2512-8:
However, a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made in
the ordinary course of business (a transaction which [sic] is bona
*Member, New Orleans Bar. This article, in somewhat different form, is part of a
paper presented at the Tulane Tax Institute in October, 1974 and will be published in
the annual report of the Institute's proceedings.
1. Morris M. Messing, 48 T.C. 502, 511 (1967).
2. 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
3. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (1973).
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fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent), will be
considered as made for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth.
Wemyss is sometimes cited for the proposition that a transfer without
donative intent may nevertheless be subject to gift tax; and the
quoted Regulation seems to say that at least some transfers without
donative intent are not subject to gift tax. There is certainly no "do-
native intent" requirement in the statute. But let us not be drawn
into Cardozo's Serbonian bog or Tucker's semantical phantasmago-
ria: the question simply put is whether there is an armslength trans-
action, and hence whether one looks for "donative intent" or "less
than adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth"4 is
not really significant.
Although the Regulation speaks of "the ordinary course of busi-
ness," the courts have interpreted the phrase to refer not solely to
what is generally considered usual business or commercial transac-
tions, but rather to armslength transactions, commercial or not, even
in family contexts if the other tests are met. Thus in Rosenthal v.
Commissioner the court held that payments for the benefit of chil-
dren could be free of gift tax if made "in the ordinary course of
business," saying:
[E]ven a family transaction may for gift tax purposes be treated
as one 'in the ordinary course of business' as defined in the Regu-
lation if each of the parenthetical criteria is fully met.6
The court in Rosenthal cited and relied on Harris v. Commissioner,7
in which the United States Supreme Court had observed that al-
though the family transaction there presented was not "in the ordi-
nary course of business" in any conventional sense, the expression as
used in the Regulation is a term of art and does not require the actual
conduct of a business.
Catherine S. Beveridge8 involved $120,000 transferred in trust
from mother to daughter. The transaction was found to be in a purely
armslength context since:
[I]n making the transfer petitioner was not actuated by love and
affection or other motives which normally prompt the making of
a gift.'
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2512(b).
5. 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953).
6. Id. at 509.
7. 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
8. 10 T.C. 915 (1948).
9. Id. at 918.
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Accordingly, the Tax Court distinguished antenuptial transfers such
as that involved in Wemyss and held that there was no taxable gift.
In Shelton v. Lockhart'" the taxpayer was an Osage Indian Prin-
cess of half-blood, who placed $300,000 in an irrevocable trust for her
children as a result of negotiations with the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
The Commissioner sought to impose a gift tax, which the Princess
resisted on the ground that she had no donative intent, to which the
Commissioner made his usual rejoinder that donative intent is no
longer required in gift tax cases. Citing Rosenthal, the court held for
the Princess and stated that even though no business was involved
in the transaction, it should nevertheless be treated as one "in the
ordinary course of business" within the Regulation, "since each of its
three criteria is fully met.""
The latest case construing the Regulation is Stern v. United
States," which involved not a family context but amounts expended
in political campaigns. The Commissioner contended that such
amounts were lacking in adequate consideration and were therefore
taxable gifts. The court held for the taxpayer, finding that her politi-
cal expenditures were bona fide, at armslength, and free from dona-
tive intent, and hence satisfied the requirements of the Regulation.
This line of cases gives rise to some speculative musings on the
nature of a taxable gift. The statutory definition provides:
Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by
which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consid-
eration shall be deemed a gift .... 1
Thus, a gift requires a transfer, inadequate consideration in money
or money's worth, and presumably (though the statute does not ex-
plicitly say so) a donee. Suppose that A, a private individual favoring
repeal of the graduated income tax, pays $10,000 for newspaper space
to advocate his viewpoint. He has simply purchased newspaper
space, received what he paid for, and all would doubtless agree that
A has not made any taxable gift. If however the ad says at the bottom
"Vote for B, he agrees with these views," would that one-liner be
enough to turn the transaction into a $10,000 gift to B? It could still
be said that A has not made any transfer at all, but has only pur-
chased newspaper space and received what he has paid for. But has
not some sort of benefit been conferred on B? Does that turn it into
10. 154 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
11. Id. at 248.
12. 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2512(b).
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the kind of transfer the gift tax statute was intended to tax? And
suppose B is A's nephew?
Suppose A puts up a fence around his property to protect it. B,
a neighbor, likewise receives the benefit of the fence on his side.
Nevertheless it would probably be agreed by all that A has not made
any taxable gift to B, for several reasons: there was no transfer to any
donee; A's motive in constructing the fence was to protect his own
property, not to confer a benefit on his neighbor; and A received full
consideration-he got his fence.
If A wanted his gardener to build a boxwood maze and the gar-
dener does not know how, and A has to send the gardener to Kew to
learn how to build a maze, could the cost of the trip, which doubtless
benefits the gardener, be a taxable gift? Or is it simply part of A's
cost in getting his maze built? If A needed a heart operation and had
to send his doctor to South Africa to learn how to perform it, has A
made a gift to his doctor? Or is it just a part of the cost of getting his
heart fixed? It seems little different from the situation of a lawyer
sending his young associate to a seminar in a distant city. The lawyer
pays for the plane ticket and the seminar fee, and the associate re-
ceives the benefits therefrom, but not even the cacistophobic Com-
missioner would contend that the associate has received a taxable gift
under such circumstances. Whether it is said that the "ordinary
course of business" exception applies, or that adequate consideration
is received, or that no "transfer" has been made at all within the
meaning of IRC § 2501(a)(1)," the basic proposition that such ex-
penditures are not gifts seems unassailable.
In the recent Tax Analysts case1" striking down the Treasury's
approval of multiple gift tax exclusions for political committees, the
court observed that political contributions are subject to gift tax
because "regardless of what motivates the contribution, a benefit
inures to the candidate."'" But the same can surely be said of the
doctor sent to South Africa: a benefit inures to him yet it does not
follow that a taxable gift has been made. The court in Tax Analysts
went on to say:
It seems abundantly clear to the Court that win or lose, a candi-
date's personal career is enhanced by his candidacy, and since his
candidacy is financed by contributions, a fortiori, a contribution
creates a legal benefit. 7
14. Faber, Gift Tax Planning, N.Y.U. 31ST INST. ON FED. TAX. 1217 n.60 (1973).
15. 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 8859-14 (D.D.C. 1974).




The statute, however, does not impose a gift tax on "legal benefit"
but rather upon a "transfer"'" for "less than an adequate and full
consideration." 9 Even if the political candidate has received a bene-
fit, so has the hypothetical doctor who went to South Africa, the
gardener sent to Kew, and the law associate sent to a professional
seminar; quaere whether any of them have received taxable gifts.
Although the Comissioner's Regulations state that the applica-
tion of the gift tax is "based on the objective facts rather than on the
subjective motives of the donor," 0 it seems likely that in difficult gift
tax cases the courts really apply sub silentio a "dominant motive"
test similar to the one the Supreme Court in Commissioner v.
Duberstein2 ' has ruled must be applied in the income tax field. Ex-
amined in context, the facts should permit the inference of motives.
Applying that rule to the newspaper ad case, if the dominant motive
is to propagate the taxpayer's own viewpoint, the ad should not be
treated as a gift even though someone benefits from it, while if the
dominant motive is to help the nephew's campaign, or to treat the
doctor to a trip, then the expenditure should be subject to gift tax. It
seems likely that this is really the rationale of the taxing statute, the
Regulation, and most of the cases that have considered the question
of whether or not a gift has been made.
CLOSE CORPORATION BAILOUTS VIA CHARITIES
Suppose the owner of close corporation stock wishes to transfer
some of it to his children. The obvious method to achieve that end is
by giving22 it to them. That method, of course, involves gift taxes,
which many are reluctant to pay even though the estate planning
advantages are obvious.
If the children (or trusts for their benefit) already have funds of
their own, the close corporation stock could be sold to them, but that
method also has its drawbacks. First, the father will probably realize
a substantial capital gain by such a sale, and may thus obligate
himself for as much taxes, or more, as if he made gifts.2 3 Second, there
18. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 2501(a)(1).
19. Id. at § 2512(b).
20. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g) (1973).
21. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
22. Not "gifting." We already have a perfectly good verb, namely "giving," and
for those who wish variation, we have two other fine verbs, namely "donating," and
in the case of charities, "contributing." We do not need to make up a new word. Cf.
Galant, Planning Opportunity: The Gifting [sic] of Closely Held Stock to Charitable
Organizations, 51 TAXES 645 (1973), an otherwise admirable article.




is the ever-present problem of valuation to be reckoned with when-
ever close corporation stock is transferred, whether by gift or sale.
Furthermore, a sale does not foreclose the Commissioner from finding
a donation in disguise, and assessing gift taxes, if the sale price was
below fair market value.
Resourceful tax planners have therefore turned to other tech-
niques. One such technique is for the owner to give the stock to a
charity, and then have the children (or trusts for their benefit) pur-
chase the stock from the charity. The desired transfer is accom-
plished, but instead of having to pay gift taxes or capital gains taxes,
the transferor is allowed an income tax deduction for his gift to char-
ity24 and he also confers a benefit on his favorite charity.
The technique just outlined was employed in Crosby v. United
States.2'5 The taxpayer gave close corporation stock to a foundation
and a hospital on two occasions and, in each case, within a month or
two thereafter the same stock was sold to trusts for the taxpayer's
grandchildren. The Commissioner contended that the donation and
subsequent purchase constituted part of a step transaction, to be
treated for tax purposes as though the taxpayer had sold the stock
directly to the trusts, resulting in taxable capital gain measured by
the amount the trusts paid less taxpayer's cost basis. Further, the
Commissioner disallowed the charitable deduction taken for the con-
tributions of the stock to the foundation and hospital.
Both the foundation and the hospital were essentially private
charities,26 the taxpayer and his family constituting the governing
boards of both organizations, and no one outside the family having
ever made a contribution to either one. Both were duly qualified and
exempt under § 501(c)(3).
The court found that the donations of stock to the foundation
and hospital were "complete, unqualified, and irrevocable gifts, with
no conditions attached or control retained. 2 7 It also indicated there
was "no evidence of any prior understanding or agreements that the
charities would in turn sell the stock" 28 to the grandchildren's trusts,
and accordingly held that the contributions were fully deductible,
and the taxpayer-donor was not taxable on the sale proceeds received
by the charities when they sold the stock to the trusts."
24. The comparison is of course oversimplified in the interest of textual brevity,
since if A sold the stock to his children he would likewise have some hard cash to put
in his pocket-but only after paying capital gains taxes.
25. 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,927 (D. Miss. 1973).
26. The case involved tax years before the 1969 Act.
27. Crosby v. United States, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 80,931.
28. Id. at 80,934.
29. The case does not appear to have been appealed.
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The court in Crosby cited and followed the colorful Sheppard
racehorse case which involved similar contributions and buyouts of
an interest in the standardbred stallion Star's Pride." Taxpayer had
a half interest in Star's Pride, which was conceded to be worth
$300,000 whole. He offered one-third of his half interest to each of two
charities, the Sisters of St. Joseph and the University of Pennsyl-
vania, both clearly public charities. On the same day in the case of
the University, and on the following day in the case of the Sisters,
taxpayer sent an offer to each donee, signed by himself as president
of a family corporation, to purchase the respective one-sixth interests
in Star's Pride for $50,000 each. Both charitable donees accepted,
thus making everyone happy except the ill-tempered Commissioner,
who was of the opinion that the charitable contributions should be
disallowed, or that the taxpayer should be liable for capital gains
taxes as though he had sold directly to the family corporation, or
both.
The Court of Claims held for the taxpayer, stating that the chari-
table donees did not act under legal obligation, express or implied,
in accepting the corporation's offer of purchase, as such acceptance
was not a condition to receiving the taxpayer's gifts. On the contrary,
said the court,
[Following the gifts there was a period of time, albeit short in
duration, when plaintiff had lost control of two-thirds of his inter-
est in Star's Pride. During that period he was exposed to the
possibility however remote he might have considered it, that [the
family corporation] might not succeed in purchasing the donated
interests short of increasing the amount of its offers.3"
The court thus refused to uphold the step transaction argument ad-
vanced by the Commissioner since there were no prearrangements or
commitments on the part of the charities to sell their horse interests
to taxpayer's corporation, despite the taxpayer's admissions that, as
a practical matter, he felt confident they would do so.
There are several points of distinction between Sheppard and
Crosby:
(1) The time interval elapsing between the contribution and the
purchase. In Sheppard, it was one or two days; in Crosby, one or
two months. The Crosby interval seems a lot safer, even allowing
30. Sheppard v. United States, 361 F.2d 972 (Ct. C1. 1966).
31. A standardbred horse is bred for trotting, as opposed to a thoroughbred horse
for running. Id. at 973 n.2.
32. Id. at 978.
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for the fact that the Sisters of St. Joseph and the University of
Pennsylvania had little use for a piece of a breeding horse.
(2) The relative closeness of identity between the donor and the
ultimate purchaser. Because the taxpayer in Sheppard was presi-
dent and owned 76.8% of the stock of the family corporation that
bought the horse interests from the charities while the taxpayer
in Crosby was one of several trustees of the grandchildren's trusts
but had no beneficial interest, it would be easier to find the
purchaser to be the alter ego of the donor in Sheppard than in
Crosby.
(3) The independence of the charities. In Sheppard the two char-
ities were a large university and a religious order, both clearly
independent of the donor while in Crosby the two charities were
controlled by the donor and his family.
The taxpayer's case in Sheppard was weak as to the first two points,
but he was probably saved by the independence factor. On the other
hand, Crosby involves facts evidencing less independence of the char-
ities from the donor than might be desired, but he was doubtless
helped by the time factor.
Four other recent cases illustrate the development of the law
with respect to charity bailouts, all four representing taxpayer victo-
ries in three different circuits plus the Court of Claims.
In Behrend v. United States3  preferred stock in a family corpora-
tion was donated to a family foundation and some years later the
stock was redeemed by the corporation. The court rejected the Com-
missioner's argument that the redemption was in substance effected
by the donors themselves and therefore amounted to a constructive
dividend. Although it was conceded that the entire transaction was
planned as a unit, i.e. it was "understood" that the corporation would
from time to time redeem the stock from the foundation, the court
concluded that such an arrangement would not defeat the claimed
tax benefits as "there was no binding obligation on the parties to
carry through any step." 4
In Carrington v. Commissioner35 the taxpayer owned all 100
shares of a close corporation, and donated 51 shares to his church,
which were redeemed by the corporation just eight days later. Again
the court, this time the Fifth Circuit, rejected the contention that the
33. 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,065 (4th Cir. 1972).
34. Id. at 80,067. The Behrend case involved tax years before 1969. Charitable
bailouts should not be tried with private foundations nowadays. For one thing, there
are restrictions on deducting the appreciation element.
35. 476 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1973).
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redemption constituted a dividend to the donor. 6 The Commissioner
said it was obvious that here was the prototypical step transaction
in all its infandous feculence, which no judge could fail to strike down
or form would forever be exalted over substance. It was obvious that
the entire maneuver was prearranged among the parties, and the Tax
Court below agreed that the taxpayers "expected" the church to re-
deem the stock very shortly. But neither the Tax Court nor the Fifth
Circuit was ready to accept the Commissioner's contention that the
donors had received taxable income when the corporation redeemed
the donated stock from the church. The Fifth Circuit said the issue
was whether the donor had parted with all dominion and control over
the donated property, for "if he did not retain any vestige of control,
the gift was complete"3 and the subsequent redemption could not be
taxed to the donor, there being no evidence of any "obligation" on
the part of the church to tender the shares for redemption.
Another case that must have looked promising to the Commis-
sioner is Grove v. Commissioner,3" in which the taxpayer had estab-
lished a regular pattern, over ten years, of giving closely held stock
to his college, which was regularly redeemed by his corporation about
a year after each donation. The Comissioner no doubt figured that
an agreement to redeem, which he had been unable to prove in the
other cases, would have to be inferred from such a repetitive pattern
of donation and redemption year after year, at very regular intervals.
But the Tax Court,4 and a 2-1 majority of the Second Circuit," did
not agree with him. Judge Kaufman, writing for the majority, sighed
that the court was called upon again to "decipher the often intricate
and ingenious strategies devised by taxpayers to minimize their tax
burdens,"'" and reminded us that taxpayer ingenuity "is ground for
neither legal nor moral opprobrium,"" citing Judge Hand's maxim
that there is no patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." The majority
36. Certain factual variants are omitted as not germane to this discussion.
37. Carrington v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 704, 708-09 (5th Cir. 1973).
38. One commentator finds a possible implication in the Fifth Circuit opinion
that the Commissioner might have won if less than 51 shares had been given. 266-2d
B.N.A. TAX MGMT. at A-91 (1974). But taxpayers have succeeded in other cases with-
out giving away a controlling interest, and the suggestion of any such implication
seems unwarranted. Certainly no direct importance was attached to the control factor
by the Tax Court or the Fifth Circuit.
39. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 81,908 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'g 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 387
(1972).
40. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 387 (1972).
41. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 81,908 (2d Cir. 1973)(Oakes, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 81,909.
43. Id.
44. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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considered itself bound by the Tax Court's finding that there was no
"agreement," formal or informal, between the donor and the college
whereby the college would offer the stock to the corporation for re-
demption, despite the "systematic nature of the gift-redemption
cycle. 415 There was not even an "understanding." It was only "fore-
sight and planning," said the court:
We are not so naive as to believe that tax considerations played
no role in Grove's planning. But foresight and planning do not
transform a non-taxable event into one that is taxable.4 6
Judge Oakes, dissenting, concluded that the donor should be
taxed on the redemption, basing his view on "the economic realities
of the entire transaction,"47 which, although in form a gift of stock
followed by a redemption by the donor-controlled corporation, was in
substance "a payment out of corporate earnings and profits to a
charity designated by the donor. ,48 The dissenter believed the regular
pattern of redemptions made it clear that the donor "could confi-
dently expect" the college to redeem."
The most -recent case on charitable bailouts is DeWitt v. United
States.55 There the taxpayer donated some close corporation stock to
a military academy, and it was repurchased about three months later
by another corporation controlled by the donor." Perhaps because the
reacquisition was not by redemption, the Commissioner in DeWitt
did not claim that the repurchase of the stock constituted a dividend
to the donor, as in the other cases, but instead disallowed the charit-
able deduction of the original contribution of stock to the academy,
on the ground that the donor had not relinquished dominion and
control over the stock. The Commissioner's contention was that the
transfer of the stock was only conditional, the condition being that
the academy was to retain the stock until the donor, through some
controlled corporation, offered to repurchase it. But the court held
that the evidence failed to establish any "agreement" between the
donor and the academy that the stock would be offered back. Said
the court in a footnote:
45. Grove v. Commissioner, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 81,908 at 81,912 (2d Cir. 1973).
46. Id. at 81,913; see also 87 HARV. L. REV. 1041 (1974) in which the author
discusses whether some level of understanding short of a legal obligation to redeem
shares may make the donor taxable.
47. Grove v. Commissioner, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 81,908 at 81,913 (2d Cir.
1973)(Oakes, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 81,914.
50. 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,869 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
51. In pursuance of a § 334(b) liquidation.
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DeWitt realized some risks existed, once he donated the stock to
the Academy, that he might not be able to repurchase the stock
from the Academy. He acknowledged that the risk was small
since there was little, if any, market for the stock . . . . The
presence of this risk factor supports the view that a bona fide gift
of stock was given. [Citations] The fact that DeWitt and the
Academy may have expected and anticipated that the shares
would be repurchased . . . does not invalidate the gift made.
(Emphasis added.)52
In effect, then, the court upheld the charitable bailout even
though both parites, not merely the donor, "expected and antici-
pated" that the stock would be repurchased by the donor's corpora-
tion. The court also referred to the "tentative planning" of the donors
in Sheppard, Grove, Carrington, and Behrend, and noted that the
redemptions in Behrend had been "contemplated." The court said
there was no basis for challenging the original gift of stock simply
because "the donor made known to the donee the road he hoped to
travel in the future, 5 3 and further observed:
The most that can be said under defendant's version of the facts
is that an understanding may have existed that the Academy
anticipated an offer from DeWitt and DeWitt expected to repur-
chase the stock. However, such an understanding on the part of
the donor and donee imposed obligations on neither and thus
cannot be said to affect the validity of the gift. (Emphasis
added.)54
In conclusion the court repeated its view that "prearrangements,
understandings or tentative planning between the involved parties
which do not impose legal obligations on them"55 cannot do any tax
harm in the charitable bailout situation."
This line of cases therefore indicates that the charitable bailout
has great advantages to recommend it. If the donee is a public char-
ity, there is still a full deduction available for gifts of appreciated
property. It is a true bailout of corporate earnings and profits since
52. DeWitt v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,869 at 83,877n.6 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
53. Id. at 83,878.
54. Id. at 83,879.
55. Id. at 83,881.
56. Since this paper was written, the Tax Court has decided Daniel D. Palmer,
62 T.C. No. 75 (1974), following the jurisprudence cited herein and reaching the same
result in favor of the taxpayer. Stock was given to a controlled foundation and re-
deemed by the corporation the following day. The Tax Court held that the foundation
was not the alter ego of the donor, that it had dominion and control over the stock,
and that there was no obligation to have the stock redeemed.
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the donor's interest in the corporation is reduced minimally or not at
all; if he owns 100% of the stock, then the gift and redemption leaves
him with the same 100%, whereas if he owns 90%, he may suffer an
inconsequential dilution-to 88.8%, for example, if he gave away
10%. Or in a family situation, if the donor is already in the process
of transferring corporate control to the next generation, and if, for
instance, the children already have 70% of the corporation, the donor
by reducing his interest from 30% to 20% via the charitable bailout
route, can boost the children's interest from 70%to 77.7% without
paying a dime of gift taxes, while reducing his own taxable estate and
generating a charitable income tax deduction."
Although the Commissioner has yet to win one, not all circuits
have been heard from, nor has the Supreme Court spoken on the
issue. The Commissioner can be expected to continue to litigate, at
least in flagrant cases, and the best approach for the tax planner may
be to avoid what is flagrant.
It is clear that a formal binding agreement that the charity will
submit the stock for redemption would be fatal, but how far the
parties can go short of that is presently an open question. The buy-
back may be "planned" or "understood" in advance (Behrend), or it
may be "expected" (Carrington), or it may be in view due to "fore-
sight and planning" (Grove), or there may even be "prearrange-
ments" and "understandings" (DeWitt). But it seems doubtful that
the Grove court would have reached the result it did had it found the
"understandings" that the Court of Claims approved in DeWitt; after
all, an understanding is hardly distinguishable from an implied or
informal agreement.
Looking at the cases with a detached eye, one must conclude that
often the parties had a "deal" worked out in advance, whether de-
scribed as a prearrangement, an expectation, or an understanding,
and whether legally enforceable or not. Since such deals are often
vulnerable in tax contexts,58 it is prudent to avoid anything resem-
bling a deal, especially since such a precaution usually involves no
practical difficulties.
Take the average close corporation. It is unlisted, it usually pays
no dividends, it has no market. If the controlling stockholder gives a
piece of it to his favorite charity, is there really any practical likeli-
hood that the charity is going to run to the nearest brokerage house
57. The method will not work with § 306 stock, since the 1969 Act. INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 170(e)(1)(A).
58. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). Cf. REv.
RUL. 67-178, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 64 involving a "gentlemen's agreement" allowing the
donor to reacquire donated stock from charity.
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to find a purchaser, or that the charity is going to refuse to sell if later
approached by the corporation? It is hardly the kind of asset that a
public charity will want to put in its permanent portfolio; it may be
restricted in one way or another; it certainly is unmarketable and
hence lacks liquidity; it probably pays no dividend; would not any
charity be delighted to receive a respectable cash offer for it? Even
in the unlikely event that some outsider made an offer for it, is the
charity likely to run the risk of alienating its benefactor by selling
stock in his family corporation to an outsider without first giving him
a chance to bid? In short, if a charitable bailout is contemplated it
seems much wiser to proceed ex parte so that the charity receives the
gift quite out of the blue. By avoiding prior discussions altogether the
taxpayer should be able to bypass the debate over whether such
discussions amounted to foresight, planning, prearrangement, under-
standings, or agreements, without materially increasing the practical
risks.
In considering the use of donation-redemption techniques, one
should bear in mind two particular caveats. The first is that it is not
feasible to donate stock to charity after the corporation has adopted
a plan of liquidation under § 337 because the donor in such circum-
stances has been held taxable on the proceeds of liquidation when
received by the charity, under the doctrine of anticipatory assign-
ment of income.5" The second is to avoid use of the donation-
redemption method in a family situation. In Greenspan Trust v.
United States"0 the court held that redemption of stock by a family
corporation from trusts created by H and W for their children were
taxable as dividends, though the corporation had donated the stock
to the trust a full eight years earlier. Though such a result seems
elementary under the attribution rules of § 318 and the Davis case,6'
it is well to be reminded that a gift to children followed by a redemp-
59. Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1973); Kinsey v. Commis-
sioner, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973). Cf. Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 593 (5th
Cir. 1971), declining to apply the assignment of income theory to an installment sale
of stock to trusts for children after the adoption of a plan of liquidation. What the
courts are saying, in effect, is that the countdown had started, the money is coming
out, it was for practical purposes irreversible (even though in one case the donor no
longer had the controlling stock interest). By contrast, in Behrend, Carrington, Grove
and DeWitt, it could not be said that the countdown had irreversibly started. The
distinction is between the taxpayer making a plan that he hopes to carry out, and the
taxpayer actually pressing a button that sets those events irreversibly in motion.
60. 484 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1973), aff'g 326 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1971), incor-
rectly captioned by West as "Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. U.S."
61. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
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tion, even if separated by many years and not prearranged, is not a
feasible variant of the gift-bailout technique."
ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME IN FAMILY TRANSACTIONS
Sometimes when funds are received by A, the Commissioner
argues that their receipt gave rise to a tax upon B, particularly if A
and B are in a family relationship or a stockholder-corporation rela-
tionship. The theory on which such a result is urged may vary and
may be given different names, but the central question is who is
taxable on the receipts.
One rationale may be the assignment-of-income theory, as in
Helvering v. Horst,63 where bond interest coupons were transferred
from father to son shortly before the due date and the Supreme Court
held the interest, though received by the son, taxable to the father.
That principle is well established and not really questioned: the in-
come had already been earned before the transfer was made. Suppose
the bond itself, rather than merely detached coupons, had been trans-
ferred from father to son shortly before the maturity date of the bond,
and assume the donor's cost basis was less than the redemption price.
Surrender of the bond would then give rise to taxable income; would
that income be taxed to the father or to the son?64
The Horst case is clear enough, and hardly controversial today,
but another Supreme Court decision of the same era has occasionally
been misinterpreted because of its peculiar facts. That is
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 5 which involved gain on the sale
of real estate. The property was owned by a corporation, which con-
ducted negotiations with a prospective purchaser. The parties had
reached an understanding on the terms of the sale, and the facts
showed an oral agreement existed, which of course was not enforcea-
ble with respect to real estate. The parties met to reduce the under-
standing to writing, whereupon the prospective purchaser was ad-
vised that the sale was being called off because of tax reasons. The
next day the corporation distributed the property to its stockholders
as a liquidating dividend, and the stockholders individually pro-
ceeded to consummate the previously contemplated sale. The Com-
62. Dividend treatment would not have been avoidable by having the trusts file
a § 302(c)(2) agreement, because the attribution waiver thereby provided is limited to
§ 318(a)(1) attributions and does not extend to § 318(a)(2) attributions (which include
trusts). REv. RUL. 59-233, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 106.
63. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
64. Cf Humacid Co., 42 T.C. 894 (1964), nonacq. 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 4.
65. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
[Vol. 35
ARMSLENGTH FAMILY TRANSACTIONS
missioner successfully sought to tax the gain to the corporation,
claiming that the stockholders were mere conduits.
The Supreme Court rendered a very short unanimous opinion,
upholding the findings of the Tax Court inasmuch as "there was
evidence" to support them. In response to the taxpayer's wail that its
oral agreement was unenforceable, the Supreme Court said:
But the fact that respondent corporation itself never executed a
written contract is unimportant, since the Tax Court found from
the facts of the entire transaction that the executed sale was in
substance the sale of the corporation."
The Tax Court had also found that $1,000 had been paid to the
corporation as part payment on the purchase price, and all the facts
taken together showed that the stockholders were merely carrying
out, as agents, an agreement made by the corporation. On the facts
found by the Tax Court, the result seems justifiable, but the Court
Holding case is sometimes cited for a proposition that goes beyond
its holding, namely that if A negotiates for a sale and then transfers
the property to B before any binding or consummatory acts are taken,
and B concludes the sale, A will nevertheless be taxed on it. In Court
Holding it was found as a fact that part of the purchase price had
been received by the corporation and never returned. Had nothing
been paid, and had the corporation merely announced to the prospec-
tive purchaser that it had decided to call the sale off for tax reasons,
the subsequent liquidation and sale by the shareholders should not
have given rise to tax liability by the corporation. Surely there is no
law compelling a party to proceed with a contemplated transaction
if he learns of its disadvantages in time to cancel it.
In United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co." a corporate
liquidation followed by a sale by the stockholders was held taxable
in accordance with its form. There had been some negotiations with
the purchaser before the liquidation. First it was proposed to sell
stock but the purchaser suggested a sale of assets instead. At that
point, before there was any agreement, the format shifted and the
parties agreed that the corporation would first liquidate and the
stockholders would then sell the assets, which was done. The Com-
missioner, no doubt emboldened by his Supreme Court victory in
Court Holding just five years before, urged the conduit theory again,
but he failed because the trial court found as a fact that "at no time
did the corporation plan to make the sale itself." The Supreme Court
simply upheld the trial court's finding that the sale was indeed made
66. Id. at 334.
67. 388 U.S. 451 (1950).
1974]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
by the stockholders rather than the corporation, whereas the lower
court in Court Holding had found that "the corporation never really
abandoned its sale negotiations." In short, the corporation in Court
Holding did not really call it off and start over; the countdown was
not stopped, but only interrupted briefly, and payment of part of the
purchase price apparently confirmed its continuation.
Do mere negotiations start the countddwn? Suppose A has a
piece of property and says to B, "Are you interested in purchasing
this property? If you are, we can discuss price but of course real estate
contracts are not binding until written, and if we make an informal
deal, I plan to give the property to my son and let him make the
actual contract and receive the proceeds." Is A starting a process that
can never lead to the conclusion he seeks? Something very close to
that situation took place in the Tax Court case of Arnold Malkan.8
The taxpayer father, in the course of a public offering of securities,
transferred some of his stock to trusts for his children and other
family members, and had the trusts contract with the underwriters.
The court held that all the gains were realized by the taxpayer, none
by the trusts.
As in Court Holding, the mechanics were not well handled. The
father waited until the last possible moment to establish the trusts;
he named himself trustee; the trusts were self-confected and most
inartfully drawn; they had to be modified because of certain omis-
sions, and were not finally reexecuted until the very day the registra-
tion statement became effective, only one day before the underwrit-
ing contract was signed. In light of the facts, the result is plausible,
but some of the language used by the Tax Court is disquieting.
The court put the question as "who realized the gain, the four
trusts or petitioner?"6 The taxpayer argued that since the trusts were
executed before the underwriting agreement, the gain was realized by
the trusts, but the court said the trusts were mere conduits and that
all the sales were in substance those of the taxpayer himself. The
court found that "the terms of the sale had been cast" before the
trusts were established, saying:
Thus, prior to any transfer to the trusts petitioner had carried on
negotiations and reached an understanding with the purchasers
regarding the terms of the sale. [Citation.] All of these negotia-
tions were handled by petitioner in his individual capacity and
not as trustee; indeed, the trusts were not even in existence.
(Emphasis added.)7"
68. 54 T.C. 1305 (1970).
69. Id. at 1311.
70. Id. at 1313.
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An opposite result was reached, on cleaner facts, in Martin v.
Machiz,7 1 where the gain on a sale shortly after a transfer was held
taxable to the transferee. Taxpayer, desiring to sell closely held stock,
carried on negotiations with a prospective purchaser beginning in
January 1960. On April 7 he established a charitable trust and trans-
ferred to it a portion of his stock; two days later a formal contract was
entered into with the purchaser of the stock. The Commissioner un-
successfully raised his conduit theory, arguing that the sale by the
trust was in substance a sale by the taxpayer-grantor, who had nego-
tiated the entire deal directly with the purchaser before the trust was
created. But the court found that despite the negotiations, there was
no commitment, even informal, to sell the stock for a specified price
before the trust was created. The court further found specifically that
on April 7, the date the trust was established, there were at least two
areas of the transaction that had not been resolved with the pur-
chaser,7" and that those unresolved matters were "substantial." Thus
the court concluded, and found as a fact, that at the time the stock
was transferred in trust "none of the parties thought there was a
contract between them."" Hence, the court said, "the substance of
the transaction was precisely in accordance with its form."74
When Martin v. Machiz was cited to the Tax Court in Malkan,
it was distinguished not primarily on the ground that the Machiz
court had found that the parties were still arguing over the terms of
the sale at the time the trusts were set up, but on the ground that in
Machiz the concept of the charitable trust originated independently
of the sale of stock, whereas in Malkan the sale and the trusts were
not independent but integral parts of a single plan. The Tax Court
did observe that the Malkan trust had been executed "only after all
of the sale had been agreed upon"75 which was not the case in Machiz,
but more emphasis was placed on the relationship between the trusts
and the sales. That seems to be a red herring. Suppose in those cases
there had been no trusts, but rather outright gifts, to children in
Malkan and to charity in Machiz. It is hard to see how that should
change the results. The question in both cases was whether the tax-
payer made a deal first and a transfer next, or a transfer first followed
by a deal.
There are, of course, a number of cases in which a donor was held
to have been in substance the seller, where the transfers did not take
71. 251 F. Supp. 381 (D. Md. 1966).
72. Provisions concerning indemnities and the security to be provided therefor.
73. Martin v. Machiz, 251 F. Supp. 381, 389 (D. Md. 1966).
74. Id. at 390.
75. Arnold Malkan, 54 T.C. 1305, 1315 (1970).
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place until subsequent to the signing of some sort of contract or
memorandum by the donor with the third-party purchaser. For in-
stance, in Susie Salvatore"5 a widow executed on July 24 a written
agreement with Texaco to sell her gas station. On August 28 the
widow conveyed a one-half interest in the property to her five chil-
dren, and thereafter everybody sold out to Texaco. The court held
that the widow had made an anticipatory assfgnment to her children
of half the income from the sale of the property, since she had already
contracted to sell it to Texaco before making the transfers to the
children, and she could therefore be taxed on the entire gain."
Similarly, in Harry C. Usher" there was signed on January 28 a
"Memorandum of Understanding" whereby taxpayer's wife Myrtis
agreed to sell her stock in Sarong Inc. to an outside purchaser, and
on February 9 she transferred the same stock to a trust for her chil-
dren subject to a private annuity. The court held that the "Memoran-
dum of Understanding" was a binding contract, and since the trust
was not free to do anything but convey the stock in accordance with
that agreement, the trust "must be considered as a mere conduit to
carry out the sale for [the grantor] and apply the proceeds according
to her direction. ' 79
The line of cases exemplified by Salvatore and Usher presents
little difficulty, because we can readily accept the idea that a binding
contract cannot be assigned without adverse tax consequences. Situa-
tions like Malkan and Machiz lie in the gray area involving an infor-
mal and unenforceable agreement, not consummated even in part,
followed by a transfer. The question is whether the gain should be
attributed to the transferor.
Obviously, from a tax planning standpoint, no one wants to test
76. Susie Salvatore, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 89 (1970), aff'd, 434 F.2d 600 (2d Cir.
1970).
77. Accord, John E. Palmer, 44 T.C. 92(1963), aff'd per curiam, 354 F.2d 974 (1st
Cir. 1965).
78. 45 T.C. 205 (1965).
79. Id. at 216. Compare the noble endeavor attempted by the taxpayer in James
M. Hallowell, 56 T.C. 600 (1971). He had some appreciated IBM stock, which if sold
would have given rise to considerable capital gain. His family corporation, however,
had substantial NOL carryovers, and he held some old demand notes of the corpora-
tion. He conceived the bold idea of turning over the IBM stock to the corporation as
contributed capital (no tax consequences), having the corporation sell the stock (gains
offset by NOL carryovers), and use part of the proceeds to pay off his notes (no tax
consequences). Had the plan succeeded the taxpayer would have reduced his appre-
ciated IBM stock to cash without paying any taxes. The court held the gains attributa-
ble to the taxpayer-transferor. But as Paoli the Corsican used to say to Boswell,




the grayness of the gray area, and it is certainly better to start no-
where down the road to sale before disposing of property."0 Moreover,
it seems reasonably clear that mere ex parte preplanning should not
be dangerous. For example, if A decides to dispose of some stock,
there is nothing to prevent him from first deciding to dispose and
then deciding that rather than sell the stock he will give it to his
children or a foundation and have the transferee sell. The transaction
is conceived as a disposition, and A may think of the donee as a
conduit, but if it is carefully executed there should be no tax difficul-
ties. The gift should be made first, should comply with all formal
requirements, and then only after the gift is completed should some-
one -acting on behalf of the donee' give the appropriate sale instruc-
tions. Such a procedure is quite customary when dealing with listed
stock. If close corporation stock is involved, the gray area is likely to
reappear because it may be difficult or undesirable for the owner to
make the transfers before embarking on any negotiations, and the
Malkan case waves a very bright red flag. Nevertheless, Malkan does
not hold that any prior negotiations at all will cause the sale to be
attributed to the transferor, and Machiz indicates that considerable
prior negotiations can take place as long as there are at least some
open questions at the time the property is given away. In addition to
leaving some sale terms unresolved, another precaution might be to
condition the negotiations explicitly on completion of the contem-
plated gift. The court in Malkan implied that would have helped the
taxpayer's case.8 1
The jurisprudence will no doubt develop on lines primarily fac-
tual, as the courts are called upon to make case-by-case determina-
tions. Practitioners should have the existing guidelines in mind, and
advise caution.
80. Concerning transfers in the course of corporate liquidations, see note 58 and
supporting text supra.
81. There is no reason why it cannot be A himself if properly authorized.
82. Arnold Malkan, 54 T.C. 1305, 1315 (1970).
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